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Abstract 
We use hand-collected board data around the issuance of two distinct government-led board 
structure mandates in the U.K. to establish the effect of outside directors on acquirer performance. 
Increases in outside director representation are associated with better acquirer returns in deals 
involving listed targets, but not when the target is private. These results are consistent with greater 
outside director reputational exposure when publicity is high. While we do not advocate mandated 
board structures, our evidence suggests that the particular diktats we examine were associated with 
improved acquirer performance in public firm takeovers. We present corroborating evidence from 
the U.S. around a similar reform period. 
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1. Introduction 
It is well known that mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are plagued by substantial agency conflicts 
between shareholders and management. The representation of outside directors on the corporate 
board is one mechanism that might ameliorate agency concerns in M&A. Given that outside 
directors are independent from management, they should be more willing to face up to the CEO to 
safeguard shareholder interests during key business decisions such as M&A, which, if poorly 
conceived, could lower shareholder value, and tarnish outside directors reputation. The global 
trend toward outsider-dominated boards, over the past 20 years and beyond, which in large part 
has been driven by government policy, buttresses belief that more outside directors on the board 
will culminate in higher performance through better board decisions (Dahya and McConnell 
(2007); and Duchin, Matsusaka, and Ozbas (2010)).  
In contrast to the positive stance adopted by policy-makers on independent boards, the results 
from studies that scrutinize the link between the fraction of outsiders on the board and acquirer 
performance does not unanimously support this view. For example, Byrd and Hickman (1992) 
document a positive relationship between the fraction of outsiders on the board and acquirer 
performance, while more recently Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) fail to report any such 
relationship, and Bauguess and Stegemoller (2008) find higher acquirer stock returns when 
insiders dominate the corporate board. In this paper we attempt to resolve this conflict by 
exploiting an institutional setting that allows us to improve upon research design, and by 
recognizing that outside directors may not be equally important in all types of deals. 
A leading explanation for the conflicting findings is that firm-level governance, and board 
structures in particular, are endogenous (Coles, Lemmon, and Meschke (2012) and Wintoki, Linck, 
and Netter (2012)). One potential endogeneity concern in our context is an omitted variable that 
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may be correlated with both better acquisition performance and higher outside director 
representation. For instance, a high-quality firm that is focused on shareholder value creation may 
initiate better deals and, at the same time, be a more desirable company for outside directors to 
associate with. Alternatively, endogeneity may arise due to reverse causality, whereby firms that 
are good acquirers are better able to attract outside directors. In both cases, absent an exogenous 
source of variation in board structure the correlation between the fraction of outside directors on 
the board and acquirer performance cannot be interpreted as entirely causal.1 
A second potential explanation for the mixed results is that the effect, if any, of changing the 
representation of outside directors on board decisions and corporate performance may be different 
across deals. Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the separation of executive 
decision making and control implies that outside directors have an incentive to perform their 
oversight duties, and not collude with managers to expropriate investors. Given a well-functioning 
market for outside directors, a failure to monitor will imply a loss in reputational capital for 
ineffective outside directors. Transplanting the above intuition to the M&A setting reveals a novel 
testable prediction pertaining to the effectiveness of outside directors in takeover situations, 
namely, acquisitions of public versus private targets. A loss to directors’ reputational capital is 
likely to be more apparent in acquisitions of public targets, which garner greater scrutiny from the 
media than deals involving private targets.2 Along these lines, Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos 
(2012) show that investment bank reputation leads to higher acquirer returns in public deals only, 
                                                          
1 Of course, another justification for the ambiguous results could be that board composition simply does not matter, 
which flies in the face of regulatory moves around the world calling for more outside directors on corporate boards 
(Romano (2005)). This view is not as outlandish as it may seem, since the classic agency view that board independence 
positively impacts corporate performance has reported mixed findings; see Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach (2010) 
for a review.  
2 Our later analysis unambiguously confirms that public deals engender significantly greater publicity and scrutiny 
from the press. 
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consistent with greater advisor reputational exposure. Overall, reputational capital theory of board 
structure invites inspection of the effectiveness of outside directors conditional on the target firm 
listing status, with the key prediction being that outside directors should be more valuable to 
acquirers in the takeover of public targets.3 
We test this prediction in the context of U.K. takeovers over two time periods when 
government-led mandates exogenously pushed British firms to elevate the representation of 
outside directors on their boards. Specifically, we study the link between board composition and 
performance of U.K. acquirers targeting public and private firms over 1989 through 1996, which 
is centered on the issuance of the Cadbury Report in December 1992. The key recommendations 
contained in the Cadbury Code were that corporate boards of U.K. listed firms comprise at least 
three outside directors, and the role of the chief executive and chairman be held by two separate 
individuals. Our second testing ground is a period surrounding the follow-up Higgs Report issued 
in 2003, mandating a further increase in outside director representation.  
An additional advantage of using the U.K. takeover market in our study is the virtual absence 
of anti-takeover provisions in British firms (Black and Coffee (1994)). Consequently, greater 
emphasis is levelled at intra-firm governance arrangements such as the structure of the corporate 
board because firms cannot adopt anti-takeover provisions that insulate them from the discipline 
of the takeover market. In addition, there are no staggered board provisions that might entrench 
board members in the U.K. Therefore, the monitoring role of outside directors in publicly-traded 
U.K. firms can be more important than in their U.S. counterparts.4  
                                                          
3 A similar prediction on the conditioning effect of target firm listing status on the relationship between outside 
directors and acquirer performance can be derived from the literature on director information acquisition costs (Raheja 
(2005), Adams and Ferreira (2007), Harris and Raviv (2008), and Duchin, Matsusaka, and Ozbas (2010)). We discuss 
this alternative explanation in Section 5.  
4 Michael Jensen substantiates this belief in his comments that “in the U.K. there is an attitude amongst board members 
to take the monitoring and control function way more serious than U.S. directors do” Walkling (2010: p.5) and that 
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In the primary analysis, we estimate regressions in which the dependent variable is acquirer 
abnormal stock returns5 and the key independent variables are the fraction of outsiders on the board 
or an indicator variable for overall Cadbury compliance with respect to the two key Cadbury 
Committee recommendations, controlling for various acquirer- and deal-specific characteristics. 
The results reveal that there is a positive correlation between Cadbury compliance and acquirer 
performance when the target is a public firm. Moreover, this result is driven by the fraction of 
outside directors on the board. In terms of economic magnitude, a one standard deviation increase 
in the fraction of outside directors on the board (0.18) is associated with 1.6 percentage points 
higher acquirer returns in public firm acquisitions.6 This is a sizeable effect, considering that the 
average acquirer return in public firm takeovers is -0.7%. We also show that deal publicity, as 
measured by media attention, indeed explains part of the differential effect of outside director 
representation on acquirer returns between public and private firm acquisitions. 
We find corroborating results when we isolate the exogenous component of the variation in 
board structure by instrumenting the fraction of outside directors with the post-Cadbury period. 
Additionally, a modified difference-in-differences analysis reveals that acquirer performance is 
higher for the set of firms that came into compliance with the new board standard and increased 
the number of outside directors on the board, or in those firms that always maintained a large 
representation of outsiders on the board. Finally, greater overall synergies, as opposed to 
                                                          
“the function of a board member in the U.S. is basically to counsel and support the CEO. In the U.K., by contrast, 
there’s a deep sense of obligation to exercise a control function, to hold management accountable” Walkling (2008: 
p.34). 
5 We will show that the results are robust to using operating performance improvements following acquisitions instead 
of acquirer announcement period returns. 
6 For a median board size of 7, such an increase in the fraction of outside directors is roughly equivalent to replacing 
one inside director with an outsider. Alternatively, this is equivalent to raising outside director representation from 
one third of board members to one half. 
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appropriating a larger share of the synergies, appears to be the source of improved acquirer 
performance.7   
A plausible question that might be asked of our analysis is whether our finding is unique, or 
whether governance mandates that call for more outside directors, more generally, are associated 
with higher acquirer performance. Fortunately, the U.K. market allows us to perform such a test 
surrounding the issuance of the Higgs Report in 2003. Thus, we mimic all the aforementioned 
analyses conducted around the issuance of the Cadbury Report to a more recent 8-year time period 
centered on the issuance of the Higgs Report in 2003. We find that U.K. firms that met the Higgs 
criteria and reconfigured their corporate boards to comprise at least half of outside directors are 
also associated with higher acquirer returns when targeting publicly traded firms. However, the 
magnitude of the response appears to have dissipated over time, which is consistent with there 
being an optimal firm-specific fraction of outside directors on the board – with the initial reform 
significantly narrowing the sub-optimality gap, if any, and subsequent reforms having less of an 
impact.  
A natural question that arises from our analysis is which of the research design innovations 
allows us to register a positive effect of outside directors on acquirer performance, and whether 
our results are expected to hold outside of the U.K. setting. To that end, we repeat our analysis on 
the U.S. takeover market over a period surrounding a similar board structure reform in the form of 
the NYSE and NASDAQ listing requirements in response to the issuance of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002. The results from this analysis of U.S. acquisitions corroborate our key findings for 
                                                          
7 To the extent that the provisions of the Cadbury Report applied to all listed firms, the boards of listed target firms 
should also be increasing the fraction of outsiders on their boards. This should work against finding improvements in 
acquirer performance, because a better functioning target firm’s board should be extracting higher prices from 
acquirers, negating any benefits from improved acquirer boards. We discuss this issue further in Section 5. 
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U.K. takeovers and confirm the importance of conditioning the effect of outside director 
representation on target firm listing status.  
We are not among the forerunners to scrutinize changes in corporate performance and 
governance arrangements in response to government regulation. That privilege goes to Kole and 
Lehn (1997, 1999) who study the impact of airline deregulation on equity ownership and CEO 
compensation. Other more recent studies include Dahya, McConnell, and Travlos (2002), Coles 
and Hoi (2003), Dahya and McConnell (2007), Duchin, Matsusaka, and Ozbas (2010), and Ahern 
and Dittmar (2012). However, a novel feature of our study is that the U.K. has witnessed the 
publication of multiple government-led mandates coercing firms to add outsiders to their boards. 
This provides a unique opportunity to gauge if market forces alone are sufficient to propel 
companies to naturally gravitate to their optimal fraction of outside directors on the board, or 
whether constant calls from government-led regulation are needed.8 
The M&A studies most closely related to ours are Byrd and Hickman (1992), Masulis, 
Wang, and Xie (2007), and Bauguess and Stegemoller (2008) on corporate governance 
mechanisms and acquirer performance. Byrd and Hickman (1992), Masulis, Wang, and Xie 
(2007), and Bauguess and Stegemoller (2008) study the effects of board independence on acquirer 
returns and report a positive, an insignificant, and a negative relationship, respectively. We 
reconcile these findings by exploiting government-led board structure mandates to identify the 
effect of outside directors on acquirer performance and show that it is conditional upon target firm 
listing status. Our identification strategy here is similar to that in Dahya and McConnell (2007) 
and Duchin, Matsusaka, and Ozbas (2010) who analyze changes in board composition and 
                                                          
8 That is not to say that, ex-ante, we expect government mandates calling for more outside directors to be effective. 
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corporate performance surrounding corporate governance reforms in the U.K. and U.S., 
respectively.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature. 
Section 3 presents the data, methodology, and describes the variables. We present our main results 
and analysis in Section 4. We discuss alternative explanations in Section 5, and conduct further 
tests in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Prior studies 
2.1. Board structure and firm performance  
The literature on the relationship between board composition and corporate performance is 
vast, thus we focus only on the studies that are most closely related to our work. The reader can 
refer to Bhagat and Black (2002), Gillette, Noe, and Rebello (2003), and Adams, Hermalin, and 
Weisbach (2010) for excellent surveys on corporate boards and performance. A major take-away 
from this expanding literature is that board composition does appear to be correlated with 
performance in the fulfilment of certain discrete board tasks, while the answer is not as clear with 
respect to overall corporate performance, with the latter being mainly attributed to the endogenous 
nature of board structure and heterogeneous treatment effects. 
As noted by Bhagat and Black (1999), prior research on the relation between board 
composition and corporate performance generally appears to show that board composition does 
influence the manner in which corporate boards accomplish discrete tasks, including hiring and 
firing of the CEO (Weisbach (1988); Borokhovich, Parrino, and Trapani (1996); Dahya, 
McConnell, and Travlos (2002); Dahya and McConnell (2005)), adoption and usage of anti-
takeover provisions (Brickley, Coles, and Terry (1994)), and responding to hostile takeovers (Byrd 
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and Hickman (1992); Shivdasani (1993); Kini, Kracaw, and Mian (2004); Cotter, Shivdasani, and 
Zenner (1997)). 
As for overall corporate performance, Baysinger and Butler (1985), Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1991), Agrawal and Knoeber (2001), and Bhagat and Black (2002) fail to document any 
relationship between the composition of corporate boards and firm value. Bhagat and Black (2002) 
note an up-tick in outside directors in firms that experience poor performance.9 The overarching 
conclusion from this line of inquiry is that board composition is endogenous (Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1998); Gillette, Noe, and Rebello (2003); Harris and Raviv (2008); Coles, Lemmon, 
and Meschke (2012); and Wintoki, Linck, and Netter (2012)).  
Studies by Lehn, Patro, and Zhao (2009), Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2008), Boone et al. 
(2007), and Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008), report that board composition depends upon certain 
firm characteristics that support the monitoring and advising roles of the board, such as firm 
complexity, growth opportunities, private benefits and CEO influence. For example, Lehn, Patro, 
and Zhao (2009) find inside director representation on the board is negatively related to firm size 
and growth opportunities. Boone et al. (2007) report that board independence increases with firm 
complexity, and decreases with CEO influence, as measured by tenure and equity ownership in 
the firm. Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2008) find Tobin’s Q is positively correlated to the fraction 
of insiders in complex firms with high R&D budgets, and that firm value increases with the 
representation of outside directors in large firms and in firms with high leverage. The key takeaway 
from these studies is that the firm’s characteristics appear to push firms toward board structures 
that meet the firm’s monitoring and advisory needs. The empirical evidence cited above is 
                                                          
9 Klein (1998) examines the connection between board sub-committee composition and corporate performance and 
finds that certain sub-committees benefit from the presence of inside, as well as outside directors. 
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consistent with the theory of board structures advanced by Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), Raheja 
(2005), Adams and Ferreira (2007), and Harris and Raviv (2008), among others. 
Finally, several studies attempt to provide cleaner causal estimates of the effect of outside 
directors on firm value and performance by taking advantage of improved research designs. 
Nguyen and Nielsen (2010) study a sample of sudden director deaths and show that firms suddenly 
losing outside directors experience negative market reaction. Interestingly, using a director fixed 
effects specification, the authors find that independence has incremental value, i.e. firms in which 
a director held an outside board member role suffer greater declines in value than firms in which 
the same director was an insider. In another innovative study, Gillette, Noe, and Rebello (2003) 
recreate a boardroom-type situation in a controlled experiment, and find that outsider-controlled 
boards are more likely to adopt institutionally-preferred policies, consistent with the classic agency 
view. 
 
2.2. Governance mandates as exogenous shocks to board structure 
Duchin, Matsusaka, and Ozbas (2010) provide further insight on the connection between the 
firm’s information environment, board composition, and corporate performance. Specifically, they 
argue that the correlation between corporate performance and the fraction of outside directors on 
the board should be conditional on the firm’s information environment: outside directors are better 
monitors, but they do not have all the information available to insiders, limiting their 
effectiveness.10 The authors use the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of (2002) as an exogenous 
shock to board composition to identify the effect. They find that a greater fraction of outside 
                                                          
10 The reader can refer to Section 2.3 in Duchin, Matsusaka, and Ozbas (2010) for a simple model providing these 
empirical predictions. 
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directors on the corporate board improves the performance of firms when outsiders face a low cost 
of becoming informed, and hurts the performance of firms when such costs are high.  
In many ways, Duchin, Matsusaka, and Ozbas (2010) go beyond Dahya and McConnell 
(2007) who analyze changes in performance around the adoption of the Cadbury recommendations 
in the U.K. The latter authors show that firms adopting the Cadbury recommendations exhibit a 
significant increase in operating performance and a significant positive abnormal return of 0.44% 
to announcements of outside director appointments. It would appear that government-led mandates 
in the U.K. and U.S. that propelled firms to greater outside director representation on corporate 
boards were generally value enhancing (and at least in the U.S., conditional on information 
acquisition costs to outside directors). 
 
2.3. Board structure and acquirer returns  
While studies on board composition and corporate performance have used government-led 
exogenous changes in board composition to alleviate endogeneity concerns, the same is not true 
of prior work that scrutinizes board composition and acquirer performance. This might account for 
the ambiguous results reported in the small number of studies on this topic. For example, Byrd and 
Hickman (1992) study a sample of 128 US tender offers and find that bidders with independent 
boards are associated with higher announcement returns. Consistent with this result, Paul (2007) 
finds that U.S. acquirers with independent boards are less likely to complete acquisitions received 
poorly by the market, and are more likely to unwind such deals if completed. Masulis, Wang, and 
Xie (2007), on the other hand, scrutinize acquisitions of both listed and unlisted targets in their 
analysis of anti-takeover provisions (ATPs) and acquirer returns, and report an insignificant 
 11 
 
association between acquirer board independence and announcement returns.11 And to complete 
the picture, Bauguess and Stegemoller (2008) focus on a sample of S&P 500 acquirers and show 
that acquirer returns increase with the level of inside directors on the board.  
 
3. Sample, data and methodology 
Our sample comprises all completed domestic mergers and acquisitions by U.K. public firms 
extracted from the Thomson Financial Mergers and Acquisitions Database (SDC) over 1989 
through 1996 and 2000 through 2007. As noted at the onset, these two time frames are centered 
on the issuance of the Cadbury Report in 1992 and the Higgs Report in 2003. An initial trawl of 
the database identified 6,931 acquisitions over both time frames. Of these, 1,253 were eliminated 
due to missing deal value and a further 1,408 due to missing method of payment information. 
Another 461 observations were dropped as they represented non-majority stake acquisitions, 
leaving 3,809. Of the remaining deals, the requisite stock price data around the merger 
announcement date from Datastream is available for 2,858 transactions. And, finally, smaller 
deals, below £1 million or those that represented less than 1% of the acquirer’s market value, were 
also excluded. In the aggregate, the final sample includes 2,292 U.K. mergers and acquisitions, of 
which 925 enter the analysis over 1989 through 1996 and 1,367 that enter the analysis over 2000 
through 2007. 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 It could be argued that antitakeover provisions render board-level governance less relevant, which might explain 
the insignificant results on the correlation between board independence and corporate performance. The absence of 
anti-takeover provisions in U.K. firms allows a cleaner test on the correlation between board composition and 
acquisition performance. 
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3.1. Acquisition sample statistics 
Table 1 presents acquirer and deal descriptive statistics for sample firms over 1989 to 1996 
around the issuance of the Cadbury Report in Panel A (Columns 1-3). Sample deals are then sorted 
by target listing status into 134 public (in Columns 4-6) and 791 private target firms (in Columns 
7-9). For each sample acquirer we take market value of equity, book value of assets, total long-
term debt, earnings before depreciation, interest, and taxes, and industry affiliation from 
Datastream. Analysts following, annual earnings forecasts, and realized earnings are taken from 
I/B/E/S. We use Datastream to extract daily stock returns from two years before to one year after 
the merger announcement date for each sample firm. Deal-specific information such as deal value, 
acquirer hostility, payment method, target industry relatedness, and tender offer status are collated 
from SDC. All pound sterling (£) figures are inflation-adjusted to the price level of 2012 using the 
U.K. GDP deflator from the Office of National Statistics (ONS). 
In Panel A of Table 1, the acquiring firm’s mean (median) market value one month prior to 
the merger announcement is £235.61 million (£81.20 million) and the mean market-to-book ratio 
for this set of firms is 2.84 in the month prior to the merger announcement. We also report run-up 
as the acquiring firm’s buy-and-hold stock return less the FTSE All-Share Index taken over 200 
days before to 2 days before the merger announcement date. The mean (median) run-up for sample 
acquirers is 10% (4%) over 1989 through 1996. Prior literature has shown that bidder size 
(Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004)), acquirer run-up (Rosen (2006)), and the market-to-
book ratio (Dong et al. (2006)) are negatively related to acquirer returns so we include these 
variables in our multivariate analysis. 
Following the method described in Moeller et al. (2007), we estimate a mean acquirer 
idiosyncratic volatility (Sigma) of 0.02 by taking the standard deviation of the acquiring firm’s 
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excess return over a 200-day period (from 205 days to 6 days before the merger announcement). 
The mean (median) leverage ratio of 0.17 for sample firms is computed by taking acquirer total 
long-term debt scaled by total assets for the fiscal year ending prior to the announcement. In line 
with prior work, we control for both idiosyncratic volatility and leverage in the multivariate 
analyses. Moeller et al. (2007) find a negative coefficient on sigma in deals financed purely by 
stock. With respect to leverage, Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that financial slack can be 
beneficial in a world of asymmetric information, while Maloney et al. (1993) show that leverage 
limits managerial discretion by committing the firm to regular interest and principal payments. 
The mean (median) deal value of £33.32 million (£7.48 million) in Panel A is the total 
consideration paid as reported by SDC. Using this number in the numerator and acquirer market 
value of equity one month prior to the acquisition announcement date in the denominator, we also 
measure relative size between the acquirer and target firm. The mean (median) relative size of the 
deal over this 8-year period is 0.31 (0.09). Closer scrutiny on this statistic reveals that median 
relative size of the deal is three times larger when the target firm is public than when it is private. 
Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) report that the effect of relative size on bidder returns for a 
sample of 3,135 U.S. acquisitions over 1990 through 2000 is negative in public deals but positive 
in private transactions. 
Jensen and Ruback (1983) report that tender offers are associated with higher announcement 
period gains. Panel A in Table 1 shows that tender offers comprise only 13% of all deals and 74% 
of those involving publicly traded target firms. We identify 1% of deals as “hostile” or 
“unsolicited” as reported by SDC. The evidence on merger hostility is mixed with Servaes (1991) 
documenting lower acquirer returns in hostile takeovers and Schwert (2000) unable to confirm this 
result. Following Travlos (1987) and Masulis et al. (2007), we also partition acquirers by the form 
 14 
 
of payment offered to the target, into all-cash offers and stock offers (either partially or fully 
financed with stock).12 Approximately, one quarter of the sample acquirers in Panel A use all cash, 
while the remaining firms include some form of stock as their mode of payment to the target firm. 
While Travlos (1987) shows that bidder returns are generally lower when stock is used as a method 
of payment in public firm acquisitions, Chang (1998) demonstrates that stock deals targeting 
private companies are associated with higher announcement period stock returns. 
There is also disagreement regarding the value of diversification. Earlier papers by Lang and 
Stulz (1994) and Berger and Ofek (1995) report a diversification discount, while later studies 
suggest that this discount may be a product of the method (Campa and Kedia (2002)) or the data 
(Villalonga (2004)) used to assess diversification and value. For completeness, we designate 
diversifying deals as those in which the 2-digit SIC code of the acquiring firm is different from 
that of the target firm. Of the 925 sample deals in Panel A, 564 are classified as diversifying. 
We now turn our attention to the governance data for acquirers over the 8-year period 
centered on the issuance of the Cadbury Report in 1992. 
[Please Insert Table 1 about Here] 
 
3.2. Cadbury Report and corporate governance data 
The Cadbury Committee was appointed by the Conservative Government of the U.K. in May 
1991 with a mandate to broadly address the financial aspects of corporate governance. The 
Committee issued its report, the cornerstone of which was The Code of Best Practice, in December 
1992. The key recommendations in the Code pertaining to board composition is that publicly 
                                                          
12 Combining stock and partial stock deals into one category is even more relevant in the U.K. setting, given an 
institutional quirk. That is, M&A regulation in the U.K. contained in the City Takeover Code requires that all stock 
offers must provide a cash alternative, which renders all-stock financed acquisitions as essentially mixed cash and 
stock deals. 
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traded firms have at least three outside directors on the corporate board and the positions of Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) and Chairman of the Board (COB) are to be held by two different 
individuals. While the Code contains recommendations of improvements to other aspects of 
governance, the key focus clearly is on improving the boards of listed firms to enhance oversight 
and accountability (as well as the role of auditors with respect to financial reporting). The opening 
section of the Cadbury report (“The Setting for the Report”) states: 
The Committee’s recommendations are focused on the control and reporting functions of boards, 
and on the role of auditors. This reflects the Committee’s purpose, which was to review those 
aspects of corporate governance specifically related to financial reporting and accountability. Our 
proposals do, however, seek to contribute positively to the promotion of good corporate 
governance as a whole. 
Other salient recommendations of the Code were: (i) full disclosure of the remuneration of 
the chairman and the highest paid director; (ii) shareholder approval of executive director contracts 
longer than three years; (iii) executive director remuneration to be set by a board committee 
composed primarily of outsiders; and (iv) establishment of an audit committee, comprised mainly 
of outside directors, to report on the effectiveness of the company's system of internal control. It 
is not clear how these other changes could directly lead to improved acquisition performance, other 
than though general increases in board independence and oversight.  
It is evident from the subsequently observed changes in board structure, that board oversight 
and CEO/Chairman separation were, indeed, the most revolutionary changes. Dahya, McConnell 
and Travlos (2002) report that the representation of outsiders on the corporate board increased 
from an average of 35% from four years before (1989-1992) to an average of 46% over four years 
after (1993-1996) the issuance of the Report in December 1992. The authors also report that the 
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number of firms splitting the combined CEO/COB position increased by 33.2% (from 63.5% to 
84.6%). The mass adoption of the Cadbury mandate represented an exogenous shock that 
perturbed U.K. corporate board structures over a relatively short time frame assuaging endogeneity 
concerns. Therefore, we are reasonably convinced that our results (if any) can be attributed to the 
increased role of outside directors. 
For each sample acquirer in the Cadbury Report period we manually collect data on board 
composition from company annual reports stored at the London Business School Library, 
Manchester Business School Library, and the British Library. This process reveals data on 744 
acquirers, which comprises 80.43% of sample firms over 1989 through 1996 (further scrutiny of 
all 925 firms reveals no discerning sample selection bias between those acquirers with and without 
governance data). 
Panel A in Table 1 also reports data on board size, the number and fraction of outside 
directors on the board, and whether the posts of chairman and CEO were combined. A quick 
inspection of these data reveals a mean board size of seven members of which roughly one third 
comprise outside directors. The board composition variable of primary interest is the number (and 
fraction) of outside directors on the board. The Cadbury Code recommended that U.K. 
corporations maintain at least three outside directors on the board. Thus, we scrutinize the number 
of outsiders in each firm at the deal announcement to reveal 396 acquirers that complied with this 
requirement (hereafter, Outsider Compliance) and the remaining 348 acquirers did not. The board 
structure variable of secondary interest is CEO/Chair Split. We define CEO/Chair Split as an 
indicator variable that takes the value of 0 if the posts of CEO and COB are combined and 1 when 
held by two individuals. In our sample, 517 deals involved acquirers that were compliant with this 
recommendation and the remaining 195 deals involved acquirers that combined the posts of CEO 
 17 
 
and COB. In subsequent analyses, we define overall Cadbury compliance if both requirements of 
the Code are satisfied. This definition yields 318 Cadbury compliant firms, and 426 non-compliant 
firms.  
Table 2 shows acquirer compliance with the two key recommendations of the Cadbury 
Report over the sample period. The percentage of acquirers meeting the minimum standards 
increases steadily over time (see also Figure 1). For example, over 1989 through 1992, almost 42% 
of acquirers had at least 3 outside directors on their corporate boards (Column 4 in Panel A). From 
1993 through 1996, the compliance rate increased to 63% – a staggering 50 per cent increase.13 
Columns 4 and 6 in Panel A of Table 2 report the rates of Cadbury compliance and outside director 
compliance by our sample acquirers. These results mimic those on the general increase in the 
fraction of outsiders. For example, compliance with the two key recommendations of the Cadbury 
Report increases from 29% to 54% from before to after publication of the Cadbury Report (see 
Column 6 in Panel A). Much of this increase is driven by outsider compliance (see column 4 in 
Panel A). Splitting the acquirers by target firm listing status does not seem to make a difference in 
the rate of outsiders or overall compliance with Cadbury. 
[Please Insert Table 2 and Figure 1 about Here] 
 
3.3. Higgs Report and corporate governance data  
 
The issuance of the Cadbury Report in 1992 spurred what can best be described as corporate 
governance mania. Since 1992, over 25 countries have issued numerous corporate governance 
                                                          
13 This percentage is in line with Dahya and McConnell (2007) who contend that this “sea-change” in board structures 
in response to the Cadbury mandate is unlikely to be endogenous. Furthermore, the authors show that the issuance of 
the Cadbury Report had an influence on board structures beyond that explained by the usual determinants of board 
composition over a relatively short time frame, further easing endogeneity concerns. 
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reports calling for increased representation of outside directors on corporate boards (including the 
Sarbanes-Oxley requirements in 2002 which paved the way for the NYSE and NASDAQ to require 
listed firms to appoint a majority independent board of directors). The U.K. contributed to this 
move by issuing the Higgs Report in 2003 to further strengthen the representation of outside 
directors on U.K. corporate boards.  
The Higgs Committee was chaired by Sir Derek Higgs, under a Labour Party led-
government, and was appointed to review the role and effectiveness of outside directors in U.K. 
quoted companies. The recommendations of the Higgs Committee were issued in January 2003. 
A key feature of the report required that outside directors make up at least 50% of the board in 
U.K. publicly traded companies. The remainder of the Higgs Report is devoted to further issues 
on the role and effectiveness of outside directors, including recommendations to: (i) improve 
independence of outside directors; (ii) appoint a senior independent director; and (iii) establish 
procedures for hiring, training, and remunerating outside directors. Once again, it is evident that 
the focus of the report is on improved board oversight, with a particular focus on the role of outside 
directors in board oversight. 
In line with the Cadbury guidelines, the Higgs recommendations were not statutory demands. 
Nonetheless, the recommendations of the Committee were embodied by the London Stock 
Exchange listing requirements and formed the cornerstone of the Combined Code (on corporate 
governance for U.K. firms), introducing additional variation in board independence. The 
guidelines on board composition put forth in the Higgs Report were not as revolutionary as those 
proposed by the Cadbury Committee, but they did coerce U.K. firms to modestly raise the fraction 
of outside directors on their corporate boards.  
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We employ the same governance variables we scrutinized around the issuance of the 
Cadbury Report, though this time the data are collected over 2000 through 2007. Board data for 
this period are partly available from Boardex, but this covers only 50% of our M&A sample. We 
therefore complement the dataset with additional hand-picked board structure information from 
companies’ annual reports and are able to bring the coverage to 72% of the M&A data. Panel B in 
Table 2 reports a 2.78 percentage point (or 5.87%) increase in the fraction of outside directors on 
acquirer boards from 47.32% to 50.10%. Much of this increase is confined to the small set of 
acquirers that target public firms. For this set, the increase was around 8 percentage points (or 
17.36%) from the 4-year period before to after issuance of the Higgs mandate. See also Figure 1 
for the graphical illustration of the evolution of board structure during this period (though note that 
the yearly data are somewhat distorting the overall trend due to the composition of firms making 
acquisitions in any given year). In the next section, we describe acquisition performance 
measurement.  
 
3.4. Acquirer returns 
The method that we employ to estimate acquisition announcement returns follows Fuller et 
al. (2002) who estimate abnormal returns using a modified market model. The model employs the 
following return generating process: ARi,t = Ri,t - Rm,t, where ARi,t is the abnormal stock return of 
acquirer i for deal announcement day t, Ri,t is the observed stock return of acquirer i for the deal 
announcement day t, and Rm,t is the FTSE All-Share Index return for day t (proxying for the market 
return). We then cumulate abnormal returns over the event window (-1, +1), where 0 is the 
announcement day in line with Moeller et al. (2004).14 Brown and Warner (1980) show that 
                                                          
14 We also estimate cumulative abnormal returns using longer event windows (-2, +2) and (-5, +5) and find 
qualitatively similar results. 
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abnormal return estimation does not improve by adjusting returns for risk over short event 
windows, nonetheless we do experiment with market-model-adjusted abnormal returns and find 
similar results.  
 
4. Results and analysis 
4.1 Univariate results 
Before proceeding with our analysis, we examine deal activity levels and deal characteristics 
of compliant and non-compliant acquirers (results unreported). We find that compliant and non-
compliant exhibit similar levels of acquisitiveness (just under two deals, on average, during the 
Cadbury period, and just over two deals, on average, during the Higgs period). In terms of deal 
types (public targets, hostility, tender offers, industry relatedness, stock deals), we find no 
significant differences between compliant and non-compliant acquirers with the exception of 
lighter use of stock deals by compliant acquirers during the Higgs period. This suggests that 
changes in deal activity or deal types are unlikely to explain differences in acquirer returns between 
compliant and non-compliant acquirers (if any). Nevertheless, we control for these characteristics 
in the regression analysis below. 
We begin our analysis by comparing compliant and non-compliant acquirer returns in 
univariate analysis. To reiterate, our key prediction is that the fraction of outside directors is 
positively related to acquisition performance, and that this effect is stronger in public deals. We 
also expect the results to be stronger over the Cadbury relative to the Higgs period given greater 
variation in board structures to the initial reform (see Figure 1). Table 3 presents the results of the 
univariate tests. 
We first focus on the Cadbury period results (in Panel A of Table 3). There is no difference 
in acquirer returns between compliant and non-compliant acquirers over 1989 through 1996. 
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However, when we partition this set into public and private acquisitions, an interesting pattern 
emerges. In the sub-sample of public acquisitions, Cadbury-compliant acquirers are associated 
with a 1.82% higher stock price response than non-compliant acquirers. Similarly, acquirers with 
at least three outside directors outperform those with less than three by 1.71%. Both differences in 
announcement period returns are statistically significant at the 0.10 level or less. Furthermore, the 
difference in returns between compliant and non-compliant acquirers in public deals relative to 
matched differences in private company acquisitions reported in the last row of Panel A are 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level or less. Turning to Panel B, we observe a similar trend in 
acquisition CARs over 2000 through 2007, albeit muted in statistical significance. For example, 
acquirers complying with the minimum outside director representation requirement of the Higgs 
report outperform those not in compliance with this provision by 1.50% when the target is public, 
and the difference between this estimate and the corresponding difference for takeovers involving 
private targets is 1.74%. Although the magnitude of the coefficients is large, none of the 
differences during the Higgs period reported in Panel B are statistically significant at conventional 
levels.  
We interpret this latter finding as being consistent with the existence of an optimal (firm-
level) board composition, and the Cadbury reform propelling the firms closer to that optimum, 
leaving less room for further improvement. To elaborate on this point, assume that before the 
issuance of the Cadbury Report a large fraction of acquirers were operating below some optimal 
representation of outside directors on the board. An exogenous push arising from the publication 
of the Cadbury Report increased the fraction of outsiders on the board, which resulted in better 
acquisition decisions and higher net acquirer performance. Given that an initial push to add 
outsiders narrows the sub-optimality gap, continued intervention for even more outside directors, 
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such as that from the Higgs reform, may eventually tip the balance of the board beyond the 
optimum for some firms, resulting in worse acquisitions decisions and performance. In other 
words, successive government mandates calling for more outside directors may be less effective 
than earlier ones when considered in the aggregate.15 
Thus far, the evidence appears to support the view that greater outside director representation 
in U.K. acquirers is associated with better performance in deals involving public targets, and this 
effect is most visible around the issuance of the Cadbury Report. Of course, univariate tests do not 
consider other determinants of acquirer returns so our next step remedies this shortcoming. 
[Please insert Table 3 about here] 
 
4.2 Regression results 
Table 4 reports results of cross-sectional regressions of acquirer CARs on Cadbury and 
Higgs Report compliance. In Panel A, the data span 8 years centered on publication of the Cadbury 
Report in 1992, while in Panel B the data span 8 years surrounding issuance of the Higgs Report 
in 2003. The regression models in Panel A are mimicked in Panel B. Of the 667 observations in 
Panel A, 18% involved public targets; while in Panel B, the sample of public targets was only 
10%. The control variables in these regressions are motivated by prior literature and include target 
firm listing status (Public Target), the method of payment (Stock Deals), attitude (Hostile Deals), 
acquisition technique (Tender Offer), relative size of the deal (Relative Size), target industry 
relatedness (Diversifying Deals), acquirer run up (Run-Up), acquirer size (Market Value (Ln)), 
                                                          
15 Of course, an alternative explanation is that the Higgs reform caused a smaller perturbation to board structures in 
comparison to the significant upheaval in response to the publication of the Cadbury Report. 
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acquirer valuation (Market-to-Book Ratio), acquirer leverage (Leverage), acquirer idiosyncratic 
stock return volatility (Sigma), and a set of industry dummies based on acquirer 2-digit SIC code. 
In both Panels, specifications (1) and (2) use Compliance as the main governance variable 
and specifications (3) and (4) use Outside Directors as a continuous measure of the fraction of 
outsiders on the board. The key result to emerge from an inspection of the regressions in Columns 
1 and 2 of Panel A is that acquirer compliance does not explain acquirer returns when considered 
in isolation. However, when this variable is interacted with the Public Target indicator then the 
resulting coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the 0.05 level or less. That is, 
compliant acquirers exhibit higher returns only in the acquisition of public targets. To further probe 
the source of the valuation gain, we switch attention to the fraction of outsiders on the board in 
Columns 3 and 4 and find that this variable is positive and significant at the 0.05 level or less. This 
result is again driven by the sub-set of public firm acquisitions as the interaction of Outside 
Directors with Public Target in Specification (4) is positive and significant at the 0.01 level in 
Column 4. In real terms, the magnitude of the coefficient estimates implies that a one standard 
deviation increase in the fraction of outside directors (0.18) on the board is associated with a 1.6 
percentage points higher acquirer returns in public firm takeovers (compared to an average 
acquirer return of -0.7% in public firm acquisitions).16 To put this into perspective, such an increase 
in the fraction of outsiders amounts to replacing one inside director with an outsider on a board 
comprising seven members (median board size), or raising the fraction of outside members on the 
board from one third to a half. 
[Please insert Table 4 about here] 
                                                          
16 The 1.6 percentage points increase in acquirer returns in response to a one standard deviation change in the fraction 
of outsiders is computed as the sum of the coefficients on Outside Directors and Outside Directors X Public Target, 
multiplied by the standard deviation of Outside Directors ((0.0098+0.0794)*0.18=1.61). 
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Panel B of Table 4 repeats the analysis using data surrounding issuance of the Higgs Report. 
The results over this more recent time frame are generally consistent with those over the early 
Cadbury period. Only the fraction of outsiders interacted with the public target dummy is positive 
and significant at 0.05 level (in Column 4) and the magnitude of this coefficient is slightly higher 
than that reported in Column 4 of Panel A over the Cadbury time frame; nevertheless, the level of 
statistical significance is lower. One can only conjecture that the power of the tests is reduced over 
the Higgs time period. Recall from Figure 1 and Table 3 that the fraction of outside directors on 
the acquirers’ boards increased very slightly in response to the Higgs reform, whereas a dramatic 
increase in outsiders is observed following the issuance of the Cadbury Report.  
The evidence presented above that compliant acquirers and acquirers with outsider-
dominated boards make better acquisition decisions in public firm takeovers is consistent with the 
literature on outside directors’ reputational exposure. We now examine whether an empirical proxy 
for outside directors’ reputational exposure can, indeed, explain some of the differential effect.17 
Given that reputational exposure is hard to measure directly, we use media publicity 
surrounding each takeover transaction as a gauge. Our belief is that greater deal publicity will 
elevate investors’ interests surrounding the actions of the board of directors and impact their 
reputation and standing in the labor market for corporate directorships. To assess deal publicity, 
we count the number of times the deal is cited in the media as reported in Lexis-Nexis over a 6 
month period starting one month before and ending five months after the deal announcement date. 
The deal is considered cited when the acquirer’s and the target firm’s name is mentioned in the 
                                                          
17 Having shown that the effect of compliance on acquirer performance is in large part explained by the increase in 
the fraction of outside directors, we now focus on the latter variable here on in. Perhaps a more direct motivation for 
this move is that the theories on reputational exposure relate directly to outside directors (and not to compliance). In 
unreported analysis we confirm that our main results are robust to including controls for Split CEO/COB and its 
interaction with Public Target. 
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same news item. We use the decile ranking instead of the raw variable in order to maximize the 
signal-to-noise ratio of the proxy.  
Table 5 reports the statistics on our proxy for reputational exposure. As before, Panel A 
reports results over the Cadbury period and Panel B over the Higgs period. A cursory examination 
of the numbers reported in this table reveals that acquisitions of publicly-traded target firms 
engender a greater level of publicity than private ones (the decile rank for public firm acquisitions 
is roughly twice that of private firm deals). If indeed media publicity is a good proxy for outsiders’ 
reputation capital then these data suggests that their reputation will face greater exposure in the 
acquisition of public targets. Though not reported in a table, we also experiment with transaction 
size as an alternative measure of publicity and the results are equally robust.18 
 [Please insert Table 5 about here] 
We now examine the differential effect of outside director representation on acquirer returns 
by target listing in the multivariate setting. To that end, we augment specification (4) of Table 4 
with an interaction term of the fraction of outsiders and deal publicity. The results on the 
interaction terms are presented in Table 6.19 For comparison purposes, specifications (1) and (3) 
repeats the results from specification (4) in Table 4. Consistent with our prediction on reputational 
                                                          
18 Yet another proxy that could possibly be used to assess outside directors reputational exposure is the number of 
board seats held by each outsider in the period before the acquisition. Harford (2003) reports that outside directors in 
poorly performing firms that reject takeover bids are punished in the ensuing years by fewer board seats in other firms, 
while those supporting such takeover bids are not vilified. Studies by Fich (2005) and Fich and Shivdasani (2007) 
arrive at a similar conclusion when examining director appointments and events of financial fraud. Interestingly, in a 
follow-up study, Harford and Schonlau (2013) show that future board seats held by the CEO are correlated with CEO 
experience rather than acquisition performance. It appears that the connection between acquisition performance and 
reputation consequences, as measured by the number of future board seats held by executives is unclear. A cursory 
inspection of our data reveals a small and insignificant correlation between acquisition performance and outside 
director board seats in other firms.   
19 We do not include the main effects of deal publicity in these specifications. Doing so causes the variance inflation 
factors (VIFs) on the interaction terms to jump above 10. There is no a priori reason to believe that deal publicity has 
a direct effect on acquirer announcement returns. 
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exposure, the interaction term in specification (2) is positive and significant (at the 0.10 level). 
That is, outside directors appear to be more effective when deal publicity is high – or more simply, 
when their reputation exposure is greatest. A similar argument is outlined in Golubov, Petmezas, 
and Travlos (2012) in their analysis of the impact of investment bank reputation on acquirer 
returns. Nevertheless, the inclusion of this interaction term only slightly reduces the magnitude of 
the coefficient on the key variable Outside Directors × Public Target (in Column 2).  An 
inspection of the data over the Higgs period confirms the results. The Outside Directors × Public 
Target interaction variable is positive and significant, the deal publicity interaction is significant 
at the 0.01 level. 
In sum, we conclude that outside directors are associated with better announcement stock 
price performance when acquiring public targets. This effect appears to be above and beyond of 
what can be explained by our proxy on reputational exposure of outside directors. Furthermore, 
the effect of more outsiders on acquirer performance is statistically stronger over the period 
centered on the publication of the Cadbury Report in 1992 and somewhat less pronounced over 
the more recent period surrounding issuance of the Higgs Report in 2003.  
[Please insert Table 6 about here] 
Finally, in Table 7, we switch out acquirer returns for a measure of long-term operating 
performance improvements. Specifically, we use the change in industry-adjusted return on assets 
(Δ IAROA) as the dependent variable. We measure this variable as the difference between 
acquirer’s industry-adjusted return on assets (EBITDA/Total Assets) three years following the deal 
and acquirer’s industry-adjusted return on assets one year prior to the deal.20 These results are 
                                                          
20 Specifically, Δ IAROA = (ROAt+3 – Industry ROAt+3) – (ROAt-1 – Industry ROAt-1). Industry ROA is the median 
return on asset of the Level 3 Datastream industry group to which the acquirer belongs. The resultant variable is 
winsorized at the 5% level due to multiple outliers. 
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presented in Table 7. The estimation results reveal that a higher fraction of outsiders on the 
acquirer’s board is associated with better post-deal operating performance improvements for 
acquirers when the target firms are public. The interaction term Outside Directors × Public Target 
is statistically significant at the 0.05 level for the Cadbury period and at the 0.10 level for the Higgs 
period. In terms of economic magnitude, the estimated coefficients suggest that a one standard 
deviation increase in the fraction of outsiders on the board is associated with a 0.025 percentage 
point higher operating performance improvement during the Cadbury period, and a 0.027 
percentage point higher ΔIAROA during the Higgs period.21 Once again, these magnitudes are 
sizeable considering that the mean (median) ΔIAROA is -0.043 (-0.023) and -0.016 (-0.014) in the 
Cadbury and Higgs periods, respectively.  
We have also experimented with the Gormley and Matsa (2014) approach whereby raw 
(unadjusted) operating performance improvements were used as the dependent variable and the 
regressions included year and industry fixed effects. This alternative specification produced 
qualitatively similar results (the Outside Directors × Public Target interaction is positive with a 
p-value of 0.11 over the Cadbury period and 0.08 for the Higgs period). We choose to favor the 
results reported in Table 7 as opposed to the aforementioned alternative specification, because 
inclusion of year fixed effects in the alternative approach eliminates time-series variation in board 
structure – which is where our identification is coming from.22 
 [Please insert Table 7 about here] 
 
                                                          
21 These magnitudes are worked out as the sum of the coefficients on Outside Directors and Outside Directors X 
Public Target, multiplied by the standard deviation of Outside Directors: (-0.0180+0.1589)*0.18=0.025 for the 
Cadbury period, and (-0.0403+0.2506)*0.13=0.027 for the Higgs period. 
22 One solution could be to drop year fixed effects to preserve time-series variation in board structure. However, this 
also means dropping a control for possible time trends in ROA. Industry-adjusting the dependent variable achieves 
both ends. 
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5. Alternative explanations 
Our key finding is that outside directors have a differential effect on acquirer performance 
depending upon target firm listing status: positive in public firm acquisitions and insignificant in 
private firm deals. Our results above partially attribute this to greater reputational exposure of 
outside directors in public firm takeovers. In this section we discuss several alternative 
explanations. 
 
5.1. Director information acquisition costs 
The prediction of a differential effect of outside directors on acquirer performance in public 
and private deals can also be explained by directors’ information acquisition costs. Theoretical 
models in Raheja (2005), Adams and Ferreira (2007), and Harris and Raviv (2008) show that the 
effectiveness of outsiders in advising and monitoring management (e.g., evaluating the CEO or 
approving a project) depends on the firm’s information environment. Specifically, outside 
directors’ interests are aligned with those of the shareholders, but they do not possess all the 
information available to insiders whom they are advising and monitoring. Hence, when outside 
directors’ cost of becoming informed is high, their effectiveness as advisors and monitors is low, 
and vice-versa. Duchin, Matsusaka, and Ozbas (2010) show empirically that the value of outside 
directors depends on the cost that outsiders incur in acquiring firm-specific information. They 
report that an increase in outside director representation in response to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 resulted in higher performance in firms characterized by low information acquisition costs 
for directors, but hurt the performance of firms with high information acquisition costs for 
directors. 
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Given that information on publicly-traded target firms is readily available in filings, analysts’ 
reports and other sources, outside directors on the acquirer’s board will, all else equal, incur less 
cost in gathering information on public targets than on private targets in order to evaluate the merits 
of the transaction.23 Acquirer’s outside directors will have little option but to rely on information 
provided by senior management and/or use more informal (and potentially less reliable non-public) 
channels to gather information on private targets. Borrowing from Duchin, Matsusaka, and Ozbas 
(2010) and prior theoretical work, it is plausible to assume that outside directors’ information 
acquisition costs are greater in acquisitions involving private targets. Therefore, the differential 
effect of outside directors between public and private firm acquisitions that remains unexplained 
by director reputational exposure could be attributed to differences in information acquisition 
costs.  
 
5.2. Governance improvements in the target 
To the extent that the provisions of the Cadbury Report and the Higgs Report applied to all 
listed firms, the boards of listed target firms might also have increased the fraction of outsiders on 
their boards. As a result, public targets complying with the reforms might also be judged to be 
better governed. Ideally, we would like to control for the impact of such an effect, if any, in our 
tests. Unfortunately, public targets tend to be small firms lacking board data in our sources. 
However, we argue that governance improvements on the target side should work against finding 
improvements in acquirer performance. 
To the extent that takeover gains represent corrections of inefficiencies at the target firm, a 
well-run target offers fewer opportunity for such gains. Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989) and 
                                                          
23 The acquisition setting also closely matches the setup in the theoretical work of Raheja (2005) and Harris and Raviv 
(2008), in which the board evaluates an investment project. 
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Servaes (1991) present early empirical evidence of this idea using Tobin’s Q as a proxy for how 
well the firms are run. Recent studies confirm these results using more direct governance measures. 
Wang and Xie (2009) show that, as the gap in governance quality between the bidder and the target 
closes, acquirer returns decrease. Fich, Harford, and Tran (2015) use the fraction of institutional 
ownership with high portfolio weights in the target firm as a measure of target firm governance 
and show that better governed targets are associated with higher target returns and lower bidder 
returns. Moeller (2005) uses a variety of governance characteristics to show that better oversight 
at the target firm is associated with higher tarter returns (premiums) and lower bidder returns. 
Finally, to the extent that better governed targets should have higher valuations (Dahya and 
McConnell (2007) find positive valuation effects and operating performance improvements in 
response to increases in outside director representation), we can control for target firm market-to-
book as an indirect proxy of how well-run the firm is. In unreported analysis we find that our 
results continue to hold, with the coefficient estimates increasing in magnitude slightly. This is 
consistent with the argument presented above that the inability to control for target firm 
governance quality is likely working against our findings. 
 
6. Further tests 
6.1. Isolating exogenous variation in board structure and identifying sources of gains 
While we argue that the variation in board structure over periods surrounding issuance of 
the Cadbury and Higgs Reports contains an exogenous component, we have yet to isolate this. To 
that end, we identify exogenous variation in board structure by instrumenting the fraction of 
outside directors on the board with a post-reform period (post-Cadbury or post-Higgs) indicator. 
An increase in outside director representation in response to the reforms (see Figure 1 and Table 
2) would imply that our time-indicator is a strong predictor of the fraction of outsiders on the 
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board, which satisfies the instrument validity criterion. At the same time, there is no reason to 
believe that acquirer returns would be affected by the reforms – other than through their effect on 
governance – which satisfies the exclusion restriction.24 Panel A of Table 8 presents the results on 
the two-stage least squares instrumental variable estimation. From here on, our discussion focuses 
on the public firm acquisitions, as this is where we found that outside directors matter most. 
The results of the first stage regressions indicate that post-reform periods are indeed 
associated with significantly higher outside director representation on the boards of U.K. acquirers. 
The coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level over the Cadbury period, and at the 0.10 level during 
the Higgs period. The F-test for the excluded instrument in the first stage is above the cut-off value 
of 10 (the case of one endogenous variable and one instrument, see Staiger and Stock (1997)) for 
the Cadbury period, but not for the Higgs period. This provides credibility on the validity of the 
post-reform indicator as our instrument for the fraction of outsiders during the Cadbury period, 
and again confirms that the magnitude of the shock is smaller for the follow-up reform. The second 
stage results largely confirm our earlier findings where we show that (exogenously) higher levels 
of outside director representation are associated with higher acquirer returns when acquiring public 
firms over the Cadbury period with a coefficient that is significant at the 0.01 level. The same 
coefficient during the Higgs period is also positive and similar in magnitude, but is not significant 
at conventional significance levels. As noted earlier, this could be a manifestation of a smaller 
incremental change in corporate boards in response to the Higgs mandate (see Figure 1 and Table 
2) and a weak instrument problem as a result. Alternatively, a subdued response might also be 
                                                          
24 If there were fundamental changes in the investment opportunity set that affected takeover profitability (and thereby 
acquirer returns) between the pre- and post-Cadbury and pre- and post-Higgs periods, then the exclusion restriction 
would be violated. However, we are not aware of any obvious differences between the periods. 
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attributed to the first reform largely eliminating any sub-optimality in outside director 
representation, such that the subsequent intervention was less effective. 
We also attempt to establish the source of improvements in acquirer performance. 
Conceptually, better acquirer performance could stem from identifying better merger partners 
(combinations yielding greater overall synergies due to better target firm selection and post-merger 
integration) or from paying less (getting a greater share of the synergies to accrue to the bidder). 
To shed light on this question, we repeat the two-stage least squares analysis for two additional 
outcome variables: combined firm gains (CCAR) and bidder’s share of synergies (BSOS). This is 
in the spirit of Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2012), who use these variables to study the source 
of value improvement brought about by top-tier financial advisors. CCAR is the combined firm 
CAR or synergy, defined as the weighted-average 3-day CARs of the bidder and the target firm 
with market value of equity 2 days prior to the acquisition announcement as the weights. BSOS is 
bidder’s share of synergies, defined as bidder dollar-denominated gain divided by dollar-
denominated synergy gain when the latter is positive, and (1 – bidder dollar-denominated gain) 
divided by dollar-denominated synergy gain when the latter is negative.25 Note that these tests 
require that we have data on target firm announcement returns, so the sample size declines 
further.26 
Panel B of Table 8 presents the results of the two-stage least squares instrumental variable 
analysis for CCAR and BSOS. We report only the coefficients of interest for brevity. We find that, 
during the Cadbury period, the fraction of outside directors on the bidder’s board is associated 
                                                          
25 Bidder dollar-denominated gain is the product of bidder CAR and its market value of equity 2 days prior to the 
acquisition announcement, and dollar-denominated synergy gain is the product of combined firm CAR and the 
combined market value of equity of the bidder and the target firm 2 days prior to the acquisition announcement. 
26 This reduction in sample size can also explain the weaker F-tests for excluded instrument validity in Panel B. 
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with higher overall synergy gains (CCAR). We do not find a significant coefficient on the variable 
capturing bidder’s share of synergies (BSOS). This suggests that the source of improved acquirer 
performance lies in more synergistic deals (better target firm selection and/or expectations of more 
successful integration) rather in paying less in order to appropriate a greater share of synergies. 
We do not find significant results for either CCAR or BSOS for the Higgs period, which is 
consistent with the above results on acquirer CAR. 
[Please insert Table 8 about here] 
In an ideal setting, we would want to distinguish between the time-series and cross-sectional 
components of variation in board structure and implement a difference-in-differences (diff-in-diff) 
analysis. Given that M&A deals are one-off events, we only observe acquirer returns and their 
board structure at the time of the acquisition. As a result, our data are a pooled cross-section and 
not a panel per se, making the classical diff-in-diff approach infeasible. A crude way around this 
hurdle would be to examine the same firms making acquisitions both before and after the reforms. 
Unfortunately, we have virtually no repeat acquirers in the public firm acquisitions subsample 
(which is where we find that outsiders matter) to conduct any such meaningful tests. 
Nevertheless, we can implement a variant of the diff-in-diff approach on our pooled cross-
sectional data and compare acquirer performance over the two time frames, 1989 through 1996, 
and 1999 through 2007, while distinguishing between firms that were affected by the reform (did 
not comply with the minimum number of outside directors requirement before but complied 
afterwards) from those that were unaffected (were already in compliance before, or chose not to 
comply afterwards). If increasing the fraction of outsiders on the acquirer’s board were truly 
beneficial in acquisitions of publicly traded target firms, we would observe improvements in 
acquirer performance from the pre-reform period to the post-reform period in the subset of affected 
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firms, but no such improvement in the subset of unaffected acquirers. However, we urge caution 
in inferring too much from this analysis given that we are not comparing the same firms over the 
two time periods, and our sub-samples are much smaller in comparison to those used in prior 
studies that have used the diff-in-diff approach. As noted above, the firms in the affected and 
unaffected sets before and after the reform are not necessarily the same, so the difference (or lack 
thereof) could be driven by unobserved firm heterogeneity; this is equivalent to not having firm 
fixed effects in the standard diff-in-diff set up. Also, note that the small number of public deals 
makes it difficult under the diff-in-diff approach to record statistical significance. With these 
caveats in mind, we perform the modified diff-in-diff tests on acquirer CAR, synergy gains, and 
bidder’s share of synergies with results reported in Table 9. 
In Panel A, we find that acquirer CARs for the unaffected acquirers increase from -1.15% in 
the pre-Cadbury period to 0.69% in the post-Cadbury period. The difference is 1.84%, which is 
not significant at the 0.10 level or less. Turning to the affected acquirers, we find that the returns 
increase from -2.74% in the pre-Cadbury period to 1.25% in the post-Cadbury period. The 
difference is 3.99% and statistically significant at the 0.01 level or less. The “modified” diff-in-
diff estimate is 2.15% with a p-value of 0.26. Turning to synergy gains (CCAR), we observe that 
the combined firm gains decline for the unaffected category and increase for the affected set of 
acquirers, producing a diff-in-diff estimate of 6.29%, significant at the 5% level. Bidder’s share of 
synergies (BSOS) follows the same pattern, but the resultant diff-in-diff estimate is not statistically 
significant at conventional levels. These findings for the Cadbury period corroborate the results of 
the above instrumental variables analysis, namely that the affected acquirers improved acquirer 
returns, and did so through more synergistic deals rather than paying less and appropriating a 
greater share of synergies. 
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Panel B presents the results for the Higgs period. Acquirer CARs increase by 3.39% from -
3.64% to -0.25% (p-value of 0.08) for the affected firms, but only by 1.67% from -2.77% to -
1.11% (p-value of 0.58) for the unaffected set. The “modified” diff-in-diff here is only marginally 
lower at 1.72%, though with a p-value of 0.59. The results on synergy gains (CCAR) and bidder’s 
share of synergies (BSOS) are noisy and not statistically significant at conventional levels. Overall, 
the magnitude of the coefficients and their economic significance in our variant on the diff-in-diff 
approach is large, however the statistical significance does reduce, which, once again, could be an 
artefact of a much smaller shock to board structure induced by the second reform. 
[Please insert Table 9 about here] 
Overall, the findings from this study show that acquirers with outsider-dominated boards 
make better acquisition decisions when the target is a publicly traded company. A proxy for outside 
directors’ reputation capital explains away only part of the differential impact of outside directors 
on acquirer returns in public versus private deals. Of course, we cannot rule out the possibility that 
target firm listing status itself is simply a better measure of outside director reputational exposure 
(or information costs faced by outside directors). More synergistic deals (better target firm 
selection), rather than appropriating a greater share of synergies, appears to be the mechanism 
behind the improvement in acquirer returns. This conclusion corroborates our earlier results on 
post-deal operating performance improvements that suggest real cash flow gains. In general, our 
findings accord well with Dahya and McConnell (2007) who report a significant uptick in overall 
operating performance of firms coming into compliance with the Cadbury mandate. 
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6.2. External validity and sources of differences in results 
Our analysis so far raises two related questions. The first concerns the external validity of 
our results, i.e., whether the effects we document hold in settings other than in the U.K. And 
second, which of the innovations in our research design (i.e., focus on a period of exogenous 
change, absence of antitakeover provisions in the U.K., or conditioning the effect on target firm 
listing status) accounts for our ability to register a positive association between outside director 
representation on the board and acquirer performance. 
To address these two questions, we conduct an out-of-sample test by re-estimating our 
baseline result on the U.S. takeover market over a period that witnessed a similar board structure 
reform, namely, the introduction of minimum board independence requirements to the NYSE and 
NASDAQ listing rules following the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Specifically, 
both exchanges decreed that listed firms should maintain a majority of outside directors on their 
boards. The variation in board structure introduced by this promulgation was used by Duchin, 
Matsusaka, and Ozbas (2010) in their study of the effect of information acquisition costs for 
outside directors and their monitoring of corporate performance.  
We employ a similar sample selection procedure that we outlined for U.K. takeovers around 
the issuance of the Cadbury and Higgs reports but this time switching to the U.S. takeover market 
over an 8-year period surrounding the year of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (1998-2005). Board data 
come from RiskMetrics. A quick inspection of these data reveals that the fraction of outside 
directors on the boards of U.S. acquirers increased by 14 percentage points (from 58% in 1998 to 
72% in 2005), or by almost a quarter. We estimate the same cross-sectional multivariate 
regressions as in our U.K. analysis. Table 10 presents the estimation results of our analysis. 
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In Column (1) of this table, we report results of the baseline regression of acquirer CARs on 
outside director representation interacted with target firm listing status. The size, sign and 
significance on the aforementioned coefficient (0.0806, significant at the 1% level) unambiguously 
corroborates our U.K. finding that the effect of outside directors on acquirer performance is 
conditional on target firm listing status. In column (2) we augment the specification with the BCF 
Index, which is an index of key antitakeover provisions devised by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell 
(2009), as well as its interaction with outside directors. Neither of these terms is statistically 
significant, while the coefficient on the Outside Directors X Public Target interaction is still 
significant, now at the 0.05 level, suggesting that it is the differential effect of outside directors in 
public versus private acquisitions – and not the absence of antitakeover provisions – that accounts 
for our ability to register a positive association between outside director representation and 
acquirer performance in the U.K. context. 
[Please insert Table 10 about here] 
Overall, these results indicate that, in the U.S. too, outside directors exhibit a positive effect 
on acquirer performance when the target is public. This analysis might also be able to reconcile 
the seemingly mixed results reported in earlier works. Let us explain. Byrd and Hickman (1992) 
document a positive effect of board independence on acquirer performance for a sample of tender 
offers, which, by definition includes only public firm deals. While, Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) 
and Bauguess and Stegemoller (2008) report insignificant and negative effects, respectively, of 
board independence on acquirer returns using samples of both listed and unlisted targets, without 
considering an interaction effect. Indeed, our study shows that the positive effect of outside 
director representation on the board on acquirer performance is confined to the public firm 
takeover deals. 
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7. Conclusion 
In this study, we set out to re-examine the relationship between board structure and acquirer 
performance. Our motivation is driven by conflicting findings in prior studies. We begin by 
presenting the case that the U.K. takeover market can be used as a laboratory to circumvent a 
number of issues that have plagued prior work, while the effect of outside directors may be 
different across deal types. 
First, the composition of U.S. corporate boards during the 1980’s and 1990’s has seen little 
variation, while U.K. boards have witnessed a doubling in the fraction of outside directors on the 
board over a relatively short time period surrounding the issuance of the Cadbury Report in 1992 
(and a more modest response to the publication of the Higgs Report in 2003). Second, board 
structure variation is generally endogenous, but government-led reforms such as the Cadbury 
Report and the Higgs Report naturally perturb board composition. And third, we condition our 
analysis on target firm listing status – public vis-à-vis private. 
Armed with these improvements in research design, we document a positive relationship 
between acquirer returns and the representation of outside directors on the corporate board when 
targeting publicly traded firms. This general result is consistent with greater outside director 
reputational exposure brought about by deal publicity. It might also support the view that outside 
director effectiveness is conditional on the cost of information acquisition – which is prohibitive 
when targeting private firms. More synergistic deals, rather than appropriating a greater share of 
synergies, appears to be the source of improved acquirer returns. 
We also show that the improvement in acquirer returns in response to the Cadbury reforms 
was stronger than that observed over the Higgs reform period, which is consistent with there being 
an optimal (firm-specific) board structure trade-off. Overall, while we do not advocate mandated 
 39 
 
board structures, our findings would suggest that the particular mandates we scrutinize were 
associated with better performance in U.K. acquirers targeting publicly traded firms. Evidence 
from the U.S. takeover market surrounding a similar reform period corroborates this conclusion. 
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Figure 1 presents the evolution of board structures over the periods surrounding the issuance of the Cadbury Report 
(1989-1996) and the Higgs Report (2000-2007). The bars show the average fraction of outside directors on the boards 
of acquirer sample firms. The red (squares) line reports the percentage of acquirers in compliance with the minimum 
representation of outside directors as stipulated by each mandate (at least three outside directors for the Cadbury and 
at least a half for the Higgs mandate). The blue (diamonds) line reports the percentage of acquirers in compliance with 
both board key recommendations (i.e., the minimum representation of outsiders on the board as described in the line 
above, and a separation of the combined positions of CEO and Chairman of the board). Note that the blue and red 
lines are not directly comparable across the two periods as the outside director compliance requirement changes.  
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for deal and firm-specific characteristics for the full sample and subsets of public and private deals. The 
sample of U.K. domestic acquisitions is from Thomson Financial SDC M&A Database (SDC) and covers the period from January 1989 to 
December 1996 over the Cadbury period (Panel A) and from January 2000 to December 2007 over the Higgs period (Panel B). MV is the acquiring 
firm's market capitalisation in £ million one month prior to the acquisition announcement. BV is the acquiring firm's book value of equity in £ 
million for the fiscal year end prior to the announcement. MTB is the acquirer's market-to-book value and is calculated as the firm’s market value 
one month prior to the acquisition announcement divided by the book value of equity. Run-Up is acquirer buy-and-hold market-adjusted return 
measured from 200 days to 2 days prior to the announcement date. Sigma is the idiosyncratic volatility of the acquirer stock return measured from 
205 days to 6 days prior to the acquisition announcement. Leverage is measured as acquirer total debt over total assets for the fiscal year ending 
prior to the announcement obtained from Datastream. Analysts Following is the number of analysts following the acquirer. Deal Value is the 
transaction value in £ million as reported by SDC. Relative Size is computed as the deal value divided by the acquirer MV one month prior to the 
acquisition announcement. Diversifying Deals is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the 2-digit SIC code of the acquirer is different from that of 
the target and 0 otherwise. Tender Offers variable is a dummy taking a value of 1 if the transaction is a tender offer and 0 otherwise. Hostile deals 
is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if a deal is reported as "hostile" by SDC, and 0 otherwise. Stock Deals represent either fully or 
partially stock-financed transactions. Board Size is the total number of directors on the acquirer's board. Outside Directors is the number of outside 
directors on the acquirer's board. Outside Directors % is the fraction of outside directors on the acquirer's board. Split CEO/COB is a dummy taking 
the value of 1 when the acquirer splits the roles of CEO and Chairman of the Board, 0 otherwise. Transaction data is from SDC. Stock prices and 
accounting data are taken from Datastream. Analyst forecast data come from I/B/E/S. Board data is from annual reports and BoardEx. N denotes 
the number of observations. All £ values are inflation-adjusted to the price level of 2012 using the U.K. GDP deflator from the Office for National 
Statistics.  
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Panel A: Cadbury Report Full Sample   Public Targets   Private Targets 
    Mean Median N   Mean Median N   Mean Median N 
Acquirer Characteristics            
MV (£m)  235.61 81.20 925  587.12 159.06 134  176.07 73.48 791 
BV (£m)  115.81 24.75 828  334.80 49.43 127  76.13 23.40 701 
MTB  2.84 2.15 878  2.50 1.79 131  2.90 2.20 747 
Run-Up  0.10 0.04 888  0.13 0.06 129  0.09 0.04 759 
Sigma  0.02 0.01 886  0.02 0.01 128  0.02 0.01 758 
Leverage  0.17 0.14 813  0.17 0.13 123  0.17 0.14 690 
Analysts Following  3.64 2.00 892  5.66 3.50 126  3.31 2.00 766 
             
Deal Characteristics            
Deal Value (£m)  33.32 7.48 925  145.77 29.34 134  14.27 6.03 791 
Relative Size  0.31 0.09 925  0.58 0.28 134  0.27 0.08 791 
Diversifying Deals (%) 0.61 - 925  0.63 - 134  0.60 - 791 
Tender Offers (%)  0.13 - 925  0.74 - 134  0.03 - 791 
Hostile Deals (%)  0.01 - 925  0.10 - 134  0.00 - 791 
Stock Deals (%)  0.74 - 925  0.80 - 134  0.74 - 791 
             
Board Characteristics            
Board Size  7.03 7.00 744  7.75 7.00 116  6.90 7.00 628 
Outside Directors  2.60 3.00 744  2.62 3.00 116  2.60 3.00 628 
Outside Directors (%) 0.37 0.40 744  0.32 0.33 116  0.37 0.40 628 
Split CEO/COB  0.73 1.00 712  0.74 1.00 108  0.72 1.00 604 
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Panel B: Higgs Report Full Sample   Public Targets   Private Targets 
    Mean Median N   Mean Median N   Mean Median N 
Acquirer Characteristics            
MV (£m)  537.34 75.44 1,367  3,171.16 182.16 131  258.19 71.35 1,236 
BV (£m)  164.48 25.46 1,296  799.43 55.60 127  95.50 23.39 1,169 
MTB  2.41 1.82 1,346  2.09 1.43 129  2.44 1.85 1,217 
Run-Up  0.27 0.06 1,247  0.27 0.02 124  0.27 0.06 1,123 
Sigma  0.03 0.02 1,245  0.02 0.02 124  0.03 0.02 1,121 
Leverage  0.18 0.13 1,305  0.18 0.14 127  0.18 0.13 1,178 
Analysts Following 2.99 1.00 1,299  5.52 3.00 127  2.71 1.00 1,172 
             
Deal Characteristics            
Deal Value (£m) 97.89 7.81 1,367  804.83 71.47 131  22.96 6.93 1,236 
Relative Size 0.52 0.11 1,367  0.70 0.42 131  0.50 0.09 1,236 
Diversifying Deals (%) 0.44 - 1,367  0.39 - 131  0.45 - 1,236 
Tender Offers (%) 0.08 - 1,367  0.79 - 131  0.00 - 1,236 
Hostile Deals (%) 0.00 - 1,367  0.03 - 131  0.00 - 1,236 
Stock Deals (%) 0.47 - 1,367  0.61 - 131  0.46 - 1,236 
             
Board Characteristics            
Board Size  6.82 7.00 984  7.48 7.00 100  6.75 7.00 884 
Outside Directors 3.37 3.00 984  3.80 3.00 100  3.32 3.00 884 
Board Independence (%) 0.49 0.50 984  0.49 0.55 100  0.49 0.50 884 
Split CEO/COB 0.93 1.00 984  0.91 1.00 100  0.94 1.00 884 
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Table 2 
Acquirer Compliance with the Cadbury Report (1992) and the Higgs Report (2003) 
Table 2 presents statistics on acquirer compliance with the Cadbury and Higgs Reports recommendations. Panel A 
covers the period surrounding the issuance of the Cadbury Report (1989-1996) and Panel B is over the period 
centered on the issuance of the Higgs Report (2000-2007). Column “Fraction of outsiders” presents the average 
percentage of outsiders on the board. Column “Outsider Compliant Firms” satisfy the minimum number of outside 
directors requirement of the respective report. Column “Overall Compliant Firms” presents the percentage of 
acquirers satisfying both the minimum number of outside directors requirement of the respective report and split the 
roles of CEO and Chairman. Stars indicate statistically significant differences from the pre- to the post-reform 
periods (*** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level). N denotes the number of observations. 
   Fraction of 
Outsiders 
  Outsider Compliant 
Firms 
 Overall Compliant 
Firms 
 N 
Panel A: Cadbury Report       
            
All Acquirers           
1989-1992   30.33%  41.62%  29.04%  334 
1993-1996   41.85%***  62.68%***  53.9%***  410 
            
Public Targets           
1989-1992   26.02%  42.42%  36.36%  66 
1993-1996   40.69%***  62.00%**  56.00%**  50 
            
Private Targets           
1989-1992   31.39%  41.42%  27.24%  268 
1993-1996   42.01%***  62.78%***  53.61%***  360 
            
Panel B: Higgs Report                 
            
All Acquirers           
2000-2003   47.32%  54.09%  50.87%  403 
2004-2007   50.10%***  65.75%***  64.37%**  581 
            
Public Targets           
2000-2003   45.69%  53.85%  51.92%  52 
2004-2007   53.61%**  77.08%**  75.00%**  48 
            
Private Targets           
2000-2003   47.57%  54.13%  50.71%  351 
2004-2007   49.78%**  64.73%***  63.41%***  533 
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Table 3 
Acquirer Returns by Compliance with the Cadbury Report (1992) and the Higgs Report (2003) 
Table 3 presents univariate comparisons of acquirer CARs by compliance with the key recommendations of the 
Cadbury and the Higgs Reports. Acquirer CAR is the cumulative market-adjusted abnormal return of the acquiring 
firm over the 3-day window surrounding the acquisition announcement, with FTSE All-Share Index as the 
benchmark. Compliant acquirers satisfy both the minimum number of outside directors requirement of the 
respective report and split the roles of CEO and Chairman. Outside directors compliant acquirers satisfy the 
minimum number of outside directors requirement of the respective report. N denotes the number of observations. 
Significance tests are two-tailed. 
     
Compliance (≥3 outsiders 
and separate CEO/COB)   
Outsiders (≥3 outsiders) 
Panel A: Cadbury Report   CAR [N] p-val   CAR [N] p-val 
        
Compliant        
 (1): All  0.64% [318] 0.004  0.67% [396] 0.001 
 (2): Public Target 0.28% [52] 0.671  0.11% [59] 0.860 
 (3): Private Target 0.71% [266] 0.003  0.77% [337] 0.000 
        
Non-compliant       
 (4): All  0.38% [426] 0.067  0.29% [348] 0.210 
 (5): Public Target -1.55% [64] 0.025  -1.60% [57] 0.031 
 (6): Private Target 0.72% [362] 0.001  0.66% [291] 0.005 
        
Difference by Compliance       
 (7): (1)-(4)  0.26% 0.386  0.38% 0.210 
 (8): (2)-(5)  1.82% 0.058  1.71% 0.075 
 (9): (3)-(6)  0.00% 0.990  0.11% 0.725 
        
Difference in Differences by Target Type     
 (10): (8)-(9)  1.83% 0.028  1.60% 0.053 
        
      
Compliance (≥50% outsiders 
and separate CEO/COB)   
Outsiders (≥50% outsiders) 
Panel B: Higgs Report   CAR [N] p-val   CAR [N] p-val 
        
Compliant        
 (1): All  1.45% [579] 0.000  1.36% [600] 0.000 
 (2): Public Target -1.27% [63] 0.174  -1.34% [65] 0.144 
 (3): Private Target 1.78% [516] 0.000  1.69% [535] 0.000 
        
Non-compliant       
 (4): All  1.36% [405] 0.000  1.49% [384] 0.000 
 (5): Public Target -2.86% [37] 0.045  -2.84% [35] 0.057 
 (6): Private Target 1.79% [368] 0.000  1.93% [349] 0.000 
        
Difference by Compliance       
 (7): (1)-(4)  0.09% 0.845  -0.13% 0.778 
 (8): (2)-(5)  1.59% 0.324  1.50% 0.356 
 (9): (3)-(6)  0.00% 0.992  -0.23% 0.614 
        
Difference in Differences by Target Type     
 (10): (8)-(9)  1.59% 0.287  1.74% 0.251 
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Table 4 
Cross Sectional Regressions of Acquirer Returns - Full Sample 
The table presents the results of cross-sectional regression analysis of acquirer CARs on the overall compliance 
with the reform and the fraction of outside directors, controlling for acquirer- and deal-specific characteristics. 
Panel A is for the period surrounding the Cadbury Report (1989-1996), Panel B is for the period surrounding the 
Higgs Report (2000-2007). The dependent variable is acquirer CAR which is the cumulative market-adjusted 
abnormal return of the acquiring firm over the 3-day window surrounding the acquisition announcement, with FTSE 
All-Share Index as the benchmark. Compliance is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the acquiring firm 
complies with the minimum number of outside directors requirement of the respective report and splits the roles of 
CEO and Chairman, and 0 otherwise. Outside Directors is the proportion of outside directors on the board. All 
other explanatory variables are defined in Table 1. Industry fixed effects are based on 2-digit SIC code of the 
acquirer. Symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. White's 
heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  
Panel A: Cadbury Report (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Constant 0.0208** 0.0276*** 0.0164 0.0285*** 
 (2.07) (2.93) (1.57) (2.61) 
Compliance 0.0046 0.0006   
 (1.16) (0.13)   
Compliance X Public Target  0.0272**   
  (2.48)   
Outside Directors   0.0284*** 0.0128 
   (2.64) (1.13) 
Outside Directors X Public Target    0.0855*** 
    (2.69) 
     
Public Target -0.0067 -0.0158* -0.0037 -0.0289*** 
 (-0.89) (-1.96) (-0.50) (-2.59) 
Stock Deals 0.0032 0.0028 0.0030 0.0021 
 (0.95) (0.81) (0.88) (0.62) 
Hostile 0.0137 0.0128 0.0148 0.0169 
 (0.62) (0.58) (0.70) (0.88) 
Tender Offer -0.0045 -0.0068 -0.0065 -0.0100 
 (-0.59) (-0.89) (-0.87) (-1.38) 
Relative Size -0.0047*** -0.0048*** -0.0047*** -0.0046*** 
 (-4.31) (-4.42) (-4.36) (-4.27) 
Diversifying Deals -0.0065* -0.0060 -0.0067* -0.0058 
 (-1.73) (-1.62) (-1.80) (-1.57) 
Run-Up     
 0.0100 0.0103 0.0088 0.0079 
 (1.57) (1.60) (1.41) (1.30) 
Market Value (Ln) -0.0009 -0.0014 -0.0008 -0.0013 
 (-0.65) (-1.02) (-0.61) (-0.96) 
Market-to-Book Ratio -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (-0.60) (-0.74) (-0.52) (-0.69) 
Leverage -0.0539*** -0.0558*** -0.0575*** -0.0591*** 
 (-3.46) (-3.59) (-3.70) (-3.85) 
Sigma 0.5185* 0.4756* 0.5330* 0.5360* 
 (1.79) (1.65) (1.84) (1.89) 
     
Industry FEs YES YES YES YES 
     
Observations 667 667 667 667 
Adjusted R2 0.0592 0.0717 0.0706 0.0897 
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Panel B: Higgs Report (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Constant 0.0119 0.0138 0.0059 0.0130 
 (0.76) (0.87) (0.35) (0.75) 
Compliance 0.0008 -0.0004   
 (0.16) (-0.08)   
Compliance X Public Target  0.0144   
  (0.73)   
Outside Directors   0.0178 0.0040 
   (0.89) (0.18) 
Outside Directors X Public Target    0.0875* 
    (1.94) 
     
Public Target -0.0261 -0.0370* -0.0260 -0.0715*** 
 (-1.60) (-1.73) (-1.61) (-2.66) 
Stock Deals -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0010 -0.0010 
 (-0.25) (-0.25) (-0.17) (-0.18) 
Hostile -0.0010 -0.0030 -0.0024 -0.0096 
 (-0.04) (-0.13) (-0.10) (-0.36) 
Tender Offer -0.0024 0.0001 -0.0020 0.0017 
 (-0.13) (0.00) (-0.11) (0.10) 
Relative Size -0.0022* -0.0022* -0.0022* -0.0022* 
 (-1.71) (-1.70) (-1.65) (-1.69) 
Diversifying Deals 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 -0.0000 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (-0.01) 
Run-Up     
 0.0030 0.0032 0.0031 0.0034 
 (0.54) (0.57) (0.57) (0.61) 
Market Value (Ln) -0.0075*** -0.0076*** -0.0078*** -0.0080*** 
 (-3.91) (-3.95) (-3.99) (-4.10) 
Market-to-Book Ratio 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (1.16) (1.20) (1.32) (1.35) 
Leverage 0.0649*** 0.0648*** 0.0641*** 0.0650*** 
 (2.71) (2.70) (2.69) (2.73) 
Sigma -0.0373 -0.0280 -0.0452 -0.0195 
 (-0.10) (-0.08) (-0.13) (-0.05) 
     
Industry FEs YES YES YES YES 
     
Observations 919 919 919 919 
Adjusted R2 0.0413 0.0410 0.0422 0.0445 
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Table 5 
Outside Directors' Reputation Exposure: Deal Publicity 
The table presents the statistics a proxy for outside directors’ reputational exposure (deal publicity) during the 
Cadbury and the Higgs periods (Panels A and B, respectively). Deal publicity is defined as the decile rank of the 
number of times the deal is cited in the media in the 6 month period starting one month before and ending five 
months after the deal announcement (from Lexis-Nexis). The deal is considered cited when the acquirer's name and 
the target's name are mentioned in the same article. % Outsiders is the fraction of outside directors on the board. 
Panel  
Panel A: Cadbury Report Deal Publicity    % Outsiders 
     
All Acquirers     
1989-1992  3.85  30.33% 
1993-1996  5.79  41.85% 
     
Public Targets     
1989-1992  6.42  26.02% 
1993-1996  8.94  40.69% 
     
Private Targets     
1989-1992  3.21  31.39% 
1993-1996  5.35  42.01% 
     
Panel B: Higgs Report       
     
All Acquirers     
2000-2003  4.29  47.32% 
2004-2007  6.02  50.10% 
     
Public Targets     
2000-2003  8.90  45.69% 
2004-2007  9.79  53.61% 
     
Private Targets     
2000-2003  3.61  47.57% 
2004-2007  5.68  49.78% 
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Table 6 
Cross Sectional Regressions of Acquirer Returns with Publicity Proxy 
The table presents the results of cross-sectional regression analysis of acquirer CARs on the fraction of outside 
directors, controlling for acquirer- and deal-specific characteristics and conditioning the effect of outside directors 
on deal publicity. The latter variable is defined in Table 5. The first two columns are for the period surrounding the 
Cadbury Report (1989-1996), the second two columns are for the period surrounding the Higgs Report (2000-
2007). The dependent variable is acquirer CAR which is the cumulative market-adjusted abnormal return of the 
acquiring firm over the 3-day window surrounding the acquisition announcement, with FTSE All-Share Index as 
the benchmark. Outside Directors is the proportion of outside directors on the board. All other explanatory variables 
are defined in Table 1. Industry fixed effects are based on 2-digit SIC code of the acquirer. Symbols ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. White's heteroskedasticity-robust t-
statistics are reported in parentheses.  
  Cadbury Report Higgs Report 
          
Constant 0.0285*** 0.0320*** 0.0130 0.0223 
 (2.61) (2.90) (0.75) (1.24) 
Outside Directors 0.0128 -0.0020 0.0040 -0.0310 
 (1.13) (-0.14) (0.18) (-1.22) 
Outside Directors X Public Target 0.0855*** 0.0773** 0.0875* 0.0716 
 (2.69) (2.45) (1.94) (1.59) 
Outside Directors X Publicity  0.0030*  0.0058*** 
  (1.90)  (2.82) 
      
Public Target -0.0289*** -0.0279** -0.0715*** -0.0729*** 
 (-2.59) (-2.52) (-2.66) (-2.73) 
Stock Deals 0.0021 0.0017 -0.0010 -0.0023 
 (0.62) (0.48) (-0.18) (-0.40) 
Hostile 0.0169 0.0153 -0.0096 -0.0156 
 (0.88) (0.79) (-0.36) (-0.58) 
Tender Offer -0.0100 -0.0111 0.0017 -0.0002 
 (-1.38) (-1.54) (0.10) (-0.01) 
Relative Size -0.0046*** -0.0050*** -0.0022* -0.0030** 
 (-4.27) (-4.67) (-1.69) (-2.13) 
Diversifying Deals -0.0058 -0.0060 -0.0000 -0.0005 
 (-1.57) (-1.62) (-0.01) (-0.11) 
      
Run-Up 0.0079 0.0078 0.0034 0.0029 
 (1.30) (1.27) (0.61) (0.52) 
Market Value (Ln) -0.0013 -0.0019 -0.0080*** -0.0084*** 
 (-0.96) (-1.42) (-4.10) (-4.25) 
Market-to-Book Ratio -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000* 
 (-0.69) (-0.65) (1.35) (1.94) 
Leverage -0.0591*** -0.0611*** 0.0650*** 0.0630*** 
 (-3.85) (-3.97) (2.73) (2.63) 
Sigma 0.5360* 0.5201* -0.0195 0.0587 
 (1.89) (1.83) (-0.05) (0.16) 
      
Industry FEs YES YES YES YES 
      
Observations 667 667 919 919 
Adjusted R2 0.0897 0.0944 0.0445 0.0545 
 54 
 
 
Table 7 
Cross-Sectional Regressions of Operating Performance Improvements 
The table presents the results of cross-sectional regression analysis of acquirer operating performance 
improvements on the fraction of outside directors, controlling for acquirer- and deal-specific characteristics. 
Column 1 is for the period surrounding the Cadbury Report (1989-1996), Column 2 is for the period surrounding 
the Higgs Report (2000-2007). The dependent variable is acquirer operating performance improvement (ΔIAROA), 
defined as acquirer's industry-adjusted return on assets (IAROA) in year 3 following the acquisition minus 
acquirer's IAROA one year prior to the acquisition (winsorized at the 5% level). Datastream Level 3 sector 
classification is used for industry adjustment. Outside Directors is the proportion of outside directors on the board. 
All other explanatory variables are defined in Table 1. Symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. White's heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  
  Cadbury Report Higgs Report 
      
Constant -0.0499* 0.0122 
 (-1.92) (0.41) 
Outside Directors -0.0180 -0.0403 
 (-0.64) (-0.91) 
Outside Directors X Public Target 0.1589** 0.2506* 
 (2.04) (1.92) 
    
Public Target -0.0610** -0.1024 
 (-2.03) (-1.50) 
Stock Deals -0.0016 -0.0167 
 (-0.16) (-1.31) 
Hostile -0.0036 -0.1409 
 (-0.06) (-1.24) 
Tender Offer -0.0033 -0.0098 
 (-0.17) (-0.40) 
Relative Size 0.0011 0.0088** 
 (0.17) (2.36) 
Diversifying Deals 0.0000 0.0200* 
 (0.00) (1.80) 
    
Run-Up 0.0095 0.0038 
 (0.61) (0.35) 
Market Value (Ln) -0.0008 -0.0094** 
 (-0.20) (-2.50) 
Market-to-Book Ratio 0.0003*** 0.0001*** 
 (8.50) (2.62) 
Leverage 0.0296 0.1245*** 
 (0.88) (4.40) 
Sigma 2.4926*** -1.1995 
 (4.12) (-1.56) 
    
Observations 552 694 
Adjusted R2 0.0670 0.0472 
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Table 8 
Instrumenting Outside Director Representation with Post-Reform Periods 
Panel A of the table presents the results of two-stage least squares instrumental variables estimation of acquirer 
CARs on the fraction of outside directors, controlling for acquirer- and deal-specific characteristics. The dependent 
variable in the first stage regression, Outside Directors, is the fraction of outside directors on the board. We 
instrument Outside Directors with the Post-Reform period indicator, taking the value one for observations taking 
place after 1992 during the Cadbury period or after 2003 during the Higgs period, and zero otherwise. The 
dependent variable in the second stage regressions is acquirer CAR which is the cumulative market-adjusted 
abnormal return of the acquiring firm over the 3-day window surrounding the acquisition announcement, with FTSE 
All-Share Index as the benchmark. All other explanatory variables are defined in Table 1. Panel B repeats the two-
stage least squares analysis for two additional dependent variables (only coefficients of interest are reported). CCAR 
is the 3-day combined firm CAR (synergy gain), calculated as the weighted average of acquirer and target CAR 
with market value two days prior to the announcement as weights. BSOS is bidder share of synergies, computed as 
bidder dollar-denominated gain divided by dollar-denominated synergy gain when latter is positive, and (1 – bidder 
dollar-denominated gain) divided by dollar-denominated synergy gain when the latter is negative. Symbols ***, 
**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. White's heteroskedasticity-
robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. F-test for the excluded instrument in the first stage is also reported. 
Panel A: CAR Cadbury Period Higgs Period 
 First Stage CAR First Stage CAR 
         
Constant -0.0085 -0.0274 0.3651*** 0.0252 
 (-0.10) (-1.10) (3.53) (0.27) 
Post-Reform 0.1357***  0.0782*  
 (3.79)  (1.89)  
Outside Directors  0.2522***   0.1801 
  (3.02)   (0.95) 
      
Stock Deals 0.0719** -0.0207 -0.0189 -0.0436*** 
 (2.02) (-1.39) (-0.54) (-3.10) 
Hostile 0.0206 0.0183 0.1335 -0.0043 
 (0.39) (0.90) (1.38) (-0.10) 
Tender Offer 0.0987** -0.0383** -0.0048 -0.0111 
 (2.50) (-2.51) (-0.10) (-0.69) 
Relative Size -0.0017 -0.0127* 0.0062 -0.0046** 
 (-0.09) (-1.78) (0.97) (-2.28) 
Diversifying Deals -0.0872** 0.0157 0.0196 0.0012 
 (-2.45) (1.36) (0.56) (0.09) 
      
Run-Up 0.0480 0.0007 -0.0158 0.0367** 
 (1.08) (0.04) (-0.97) (2.46) 
Market Value (Ln) 0.0332*** -0.0032 0.0230*** -0.0074 
 (3.17) (-0.69) (2.69) (-1.51) 
Market-to-Book Ratio 0.0010 0.0002 -0.0000 0.0002*** 
 (1.17) (0.71) (-0.32) (2.99) 
Leverage 0.1069 -0.0850* -0.0781 0.0432 
 (0.96) (-1.84) (-0.70) (0.98) 
Sigma 1.0094 0.6202 -1.0446 -3.1700*** 
 (0.43) (1.10) (-0.57) (-2.79) 
     
F-test for excluded instrument 14.37  3.59   
Observations 104 104 94 94 
Adjusted R2 0.2991 0.1670 0.0874 0.1467 
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Panel B: CCAR and BSOS Cadbury Period Higgs Period 
 Outside Directors CCAR BSOS Outside Directors CCAR BSOS 
            
Post-Reform 0.1126**   0.0838*   
 (2.34)   (1.99)   
Outside Directors  0.2862** 6.4606  0.1333 4.1368 
  (2.22) (0.49)  (0.66) (0.28) 
        
F-test for excluded instrument 5.49    3.97   
Observations 62 62 62 89 89 89 
Adjusted R2 0.3615 0.1510 0.0642 0.1100 0.0863 -0.0059 
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Table 9 
Modified Difference-in-Differences Test 
The table presents a variant of the difference-in-differences test of acquirer CAR, combined firm CAR (CCAR), 
and bidder share of synergies (BSOS) in public deals for the affected and unaffected sets of acquirers before and 
after the reform. Acquirer CAR is the cumulative market-adjusted abnormal return of the acquiring firm over the 
3-day window surrounding the acquisition announcement, with FTSE All-Share Index as the benchmark. CCAR is 
the 3-day combined firm CAR (synergy gain), calculated as the weighted average of acquirer and target CAR with 
market value two days prior to the announcement as weights. BSOS is bidder share of synergies, computed as bidder 
dollar-denominated gain divided by dollar-denominated synergy gain when latter is positive, and (1 – bidder dollar-
denominated gain) divided by dollar-denominated synergy gain when the latter is negative. The affected set of 
acquirers consists of firms not satisfying the minimum number of outside directors’ requirement of the respective 
report in the pre-reform period and of firms satisfying it in the post-reform period. The unaffected set consists of 
acquirers already in compliance with the minimum number of outside directors’ requirement of the respective report 
in the pre-reform period and of acquirers not complying with it in the post-reform period. N denotes the number of 
observations. Significance tests are two-tailed. 
Panel A: Cadbury CAR [N] p-val   CCAR [N] p-val   BSOS [N] p-val 
          
Unaffected          
(1): Pre  -1.15% [28] 0.073  3.39% [18] 0.007  -1.20 [18] N/A 
(2): Post  0.69% [19] 0.579  1.30% [10] 0.273  -3.36 [10] N/A 
(3): Diff (2)-(1) 1.84% 0.148  -2.09% 0.232  -2.16 0.184 
          
Affected          
(4): Pre  -2.74% [38] 0.002  1.45% [23] 0.358  -3.69 [23] N/A 
(5): Post  1.25% [31] 0.226  5.65% [18] 0.003  -1.49 [18] N/A 
(6): Diff (5)-(4) 3.99% 0.003  4.20% 0.072  2.19 0.523 
          
(7): Diff-in-Diff (6)-(3) 2.15% 0.259  6.29% 0.026  4.35 0.233 
          
Panel B: Higgs CAR [N] p-val   CCAR [N] p-val   BSOS [N] p-val 
          
Unaffected          
(1): Pre  -2.77% [28] 0.125  0.12% [24] 0.922  -2.96 [24] N/A 
(2): Post  -1.11% [11] 0.515  4.74% [11] 0.110   -0.82 [11] N/A 
(3): Diff (2)-(1) 1.67% 0.581  -4.86% 0.070   2.14 0.502 
          
Affected          
(4): Pre  -3.64% [24] 0.078  2.56% [22] 0.213  -0.70 [22] N/A 
(5): Post  -0.25% [37] 0.773  2.48% [37] 0.021   -1.47 [37] N/A 
(6): Diff (5)-(4) 3.39% 0.080  0.08% 0.968  -0.77 0.610 
          
(7): Diff-in-Diff (6)-(3) 1.72% 0.592   -4.94% 0.182   -2.90 0.242 
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Table 10 
The U.S. Takeover Market Surrounding Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2005) and Subsequent Listing Requirements 
The table presents the results of cross-sectional regression analysis of acquirer CARs on the fraction of outside 
directors, controlling for acquirer- and deal-specific characteristics. The sample covers U.S. domestic acquisitions of 
public and private targets during the 8-year period centered on the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (1998-2005) for 
which governance data are available from RiskMetrics. The dependent variable is acquirer CAR, which is the 
cumulative market-adjusted abnormal return of the acquiring firm over the 3-day window surrounding the acquisition 
announcement, with CRSP value-weighted index as the benchmark. Outside Directors is the proportion of outside 
directors on the board. BCF Index is the index of antitakeover provisions created by Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell 
(2009). All other explanatory variables are defined in Table 1. Industry fixed effects are based on 2-digit SIC code of 
the acquirer. Symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. White's 
heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  
  (1) (2) 
   
Constant 0.0813*** 0.0736*** 
 (4.05) (2.88) 
Outside Directors -0.0563*** -0.0401 
 (-3.10) (-1.44) 
Outside Directors X Public Target 0.0873*** 0.0550** 
 (3.71) (2.27) 
Public Target -0.0861*** -0.0600*** 
 (-5.17) (-3.41) 
Outside Directors X BCF Index  -0.0017 
  (-0.25) 
BCF Index  0.0013 
  (0.14) 
   
Stock Deals -0.0037 -0.0073* 
 (-0.87) (-1.67) 
Hostile 0.0029 0.0025 
 (0.17) (0.15) 
Tender Offer 0.0131 0.0135* 
 (1.51) (1.81) 
Relative Size -0.0264*** -0.0191** 
 (-2.93) (-2.03) 
Diversifying deals 0.0003 -0.0026 
 (0.05) (-0.54) 
   
Run-Up 0.0041 0.0021 
 (1.25) (0.42) 
Market Value (Ln) -0.0052*** -0.0048*** 
 (-3.14) (-2.86) 
Market-to-Book Ratio 0.0004* 0.0004 
 (1.83) (1.34) 
Leverage 0.0154 0.0224 
 (1.14) (1.57) 
Sigma -0.3255 -0.4633* 
 (-1.34) (-1.93) 
   
Industry FEs YES YES 
   
Observations 1,523 1,250 
Adjusted R2 0.0643 0.0604 
 
